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Introduction
Just	as	a	 theory	of	 representation	 is	deficient	 if	 it	 can’t	explain	how	
misrepresentation	is	possible,	a	theory	of	computation	is	deficient	if	it	
can’t	explain	how	miscomputation	is	possible.	You	might	expect,	then,	
that	 philosophers	 of	 computation	 have	well-worked-out	 theories	 of	
miscomputation.	 But	 you’d	 be	wrong.	 They	 have	 generally	 ignored	
miscomputation.1 





as	 something	 doesn’t	 misrepresent	 unless	 it	 represents,	 something	







straightforward	 explanation	 of	 miscomputation.	 Piccinini	 contends	
that,	 by	 appealing	 to	 teleological	 functions,	 his	 externalist	 account	
also	enjoys	this	advantage.	It	does	not.	Not	yet,	anyway.	Following	just	





1.	 This	 apparent	 fact	 is	 bemoaned	 by	Dewhurst	 (2014),	 Fresco	 and	 Primiero	
(2013:	254),	and	Piccinini	(2015:	14,	48).	
2.	 Allen’s	SEP	 entry	on	 “Teleological	Notions	 in	Biology”	does	not	even	 raise	
the	question	of	how	to	individuate	a	biological	system’s	behavior	when	the	
behavior	fails	to	fulfill	its	(proper	or	teleological)	function.
3.	 Thanks	 to	 Gualtiero	 Piccinini	 for	 pointing	 out	 that	 my	 approach	 was	
distinctive.












structure	of	 the	 system.	Such	views	 trivialize	 computation	by	being	
committed	 to	 unlimited pancomputationalism,	 i.e.,	 the	 idea	 that	
every	physical	system	computes	every	 computation.	To	do	better,	we	
must	 impose	 restrictions	 on	 which	mappings	 capture	 the	 computa-
tional	structure	of	a	system.	




structure	 is	 not	merely	 to	 describe	 the	 system:	 it	 is	 to	 explain,	 at	 a	
















advantages	 of	my	 individualist	 approach	 to	 explaining	miscomputa-
tion	while	nonetheless	avoiding	its	drawback.
I	assume	that	a	mechanistic	(functional)	theory	of	computational	
individuation	 is	 true	 and	 that	 content	 is	 not	 needed	 to	 individuate	
computational	 structure.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 framework	 tend	 to	 be	
externalists,	 so	 in	§1,	 I	 explain	why	we	should	 take	an	 individualist	
version	of	the	mechanistic	theory	seriously.	In	§2,	I	show	that	this	in-
dividualist,	mechanistic	theory	easily	accounts	for	miscomputation.	In	
§3,	 I	 criticize	an	externalist	 approach	 to	explaining	miscomputation	
inspired	by	Piccinini’s	work.	 In	§4,	 I	briefly	 introduce	the	quasi-indi-
vidualist	theory	that	may	get	the	advantages	of	both	my	account	and	
Piccinini’s	without	any	of	the	disadvantages.	
1. Computational Structures and Functional Structures
In	 this	 section,	 I	 explain	why	an	 individualist	mechanistic	 theory	 is	
worth	taking	seriously.	In	§1.1,	I’ll	rehearse	a	mostly	familiar	rationale	
for	the	mechanistic	theory,	while	highlighting	its	neutrality	between	

















mechanistic	 theories	 with	 some	 protection	 against	 limited	 pancom-














anistic	structure,	but	 to	 impose	 further	restrictions	on	which	mecha-
nistic	structures	are	computational.	Digestive	organs	are	mechanisms,	





Medium-independence	 is	 stronger	 than	 multiple	 realizability.	
There	is	more	than	one	way	to	realize	removing corks from wine bottles, 
but	 this	behavior	 is	necessarily	performed	on	certain	kind	of	media,	
7.	 See	 Coelho	 Mollo	 (2018)	 for	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 mechanistic	 theories	 of	






functionalist	 theory	 claims	 that	 digits	 are	 individuated	 according	 to	
their	functional	significance	in	the	system.	If	a	system’s	outputs	aren’t	
differentially	sensitive	to	input	voltages	of	≤5v,	then	the	computation-









While	 the	 simple	 functionalist	 view	 is	 an	 improvement	 over	 the	




computes	 at least one	 computation	 (cf.	 Chalmers	 2011:	 331).	 It	 also	
seems	committed	to	the	idea	that	digestive	processes	implement	some	
computation	or	another	(cf.	332).	
We	 can	make	 a	 little	more	progress	by	 endorsing	 a	mechanistic 
(functionalist) theory	of	computation.	To	be	a	mechanism	is,	among	
other	 things,	 to	 have	 parts	 whose	 integrated	 operation	 explains	 its	
overall	 behavior.	 Mechanistic	 theories	 hold	 that	 only	 mechanisms	
compute	and	that	the	computationally	relevant	functional	structure	is	
5.	 See	Dewhurst	 2018	 (especially	 110–1)	 for	 clarification	 and	 further	 defense	


















individuate	 a	 system’s	 computational	 structure.	 The	 definitive	 list,	
then,	 is	 the	correct	and	complete	account	of	which	 functional	 struc-
tures	 count	 as	 computational	 and	 which	 differences	 between	 func-
tional	 structures	 make	 a	 computational	 difference.	 I’ll	 pretend	 that	
Piccinini	has	given	us	the	definitive	list,	but	even	he	admits	that	his	
list	is	incomplete	(2015:	120).9 
My	 individualist	 account	 is	 identical	 to	 that	 of	 Piccinini	 (2007;	




system	of	which	 it	 is	 a	 part,	 can	make	 a	 difference	 to	what	 compu-
tational	 structure	 the	system	has.	 I	 claim	 it	 is	 individuated	narrowly:	
the	environment	(broadly	construed)	cannot	affect	the	computational	
individuation	of	a	 system.	He’s	a	 computational	externalist,	 and	 I’m	
an	individualist.	The	second	difference	concerns	whether	the	compu-
tationally	 relevant	 functional	 structure	 involves	 normatively	 loaded	
teleology,	i.e.,	whether	the	computationally	relevant	functional	struc-
ture	determines	what	the	system	should	be	doing.	He	says	yes;	I	say	no.	















Computational	 structures,	 then,	 are	 medium-independent	 func-
tional	 structures.	 These	 structures	 individuate	 digits.	What	 individu-
ates	a	digit	 is	not	 that	 it	plays	some	 functional	 role	 in	 the	system	at	
some	level	of	abstraction,	as	long	as	there	is	some	(perhaps	distinct)	
level	 of	 abstraction	 in	 which	 the	 system	 has	 medium-independent	
functional	structure.	Rather:
Medium-Independent Individuation:	to	be	a	digit	is	to	















1.2. An Individualist Mechanistic Theory
The	most	promising	mechanistic	theories	will	 impose	further	restric-
tions	 beyond	 those	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 sub-section	—	both	







































S*.	 Piccinini	 assumes	 Digital Perseverance:	 necessarily,	 feature	 F	
counts	as	a	distinct	digit	for	S	only	if	F	counts	as	a	distinct	digit	for	S*.	






over	 three	digits,	<2.5v	(0),	2.5v	up	 to	5v	(½),	and	≤5v	(1).	 If	Digital	
Perseverance	is	true,	then	so	is	computational	externalism.	For,	given	
Digital	 Perseverance,	 the	 computational	 structure	 of	 a	 part	 can’t	 su-
pervene	on	 its	physical	structure,	 though	 it	might	supervene	on	 the	
physical	 structure	of	 the	whole	mechanism	of	which	 it	 is	 a	 part	 (cf.	
Segal	1991:	492–3).	















when	 the	 device	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 differentially	 sensitive	 only	 to	 two	
10.	 Parts	tend	to	perform	simpler	computations,	because	systems	are	generally	
constructed	so	 that	 their	computing	operations	are	somewhat	efficient.	 It’s	
possible	for	the	parts	to	perform	more	complex	computations	than	the	whole.
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problems	are	equally	bad.	A	 theory	has	 a	qualitative overcounting 
problem	iff:	the	theory	claims	that	a	system	computes	function	F	when	
the	system	is	not	even	eligible	to	compute	F.	A	theory	has	a	(merely) 











small	advantage	 for	Piccinini	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	way	 for	Piccinini	 to	
claim	that	I	have	a	qualitative	overcounting	problem	that	he	doesn’t	


















constraints	on	which	teleological	 functions	 it	has.	 It	can’t	be	a	teleo-










ated	 functional	 structure	 that	 satisfies	 the	 definitive	 list.	 This	 is	 suf-
ficient	for	computation	on	my	account	(my	individualist	view	entails	























volves	 at	 least	 three	 components:	 an	 account	 of	 computational	 be-
havior	(what	computation,	if	any,	a	system	is	performing);	an	account	
of	 computational	 norms	 (what	 computation[s]	 the	 system	 should be 
performing);	and	an	explanation	of	how	these	two	accounts	together	
make	 it	possible	 for	a	 system	 to	compute	 in	a	way	 it	 should	not	be	
computing.	The	 latter	 explanation	may	be	 as	 trivial	 as	pointing	out	





































It	 is	 special	 in	 two	ways.	First,	while	malfunctions	 require	normativ-
ity	 at	 some	 level	 of	 description,	miscomputation	 involves	 normativ-
ity,	more	 specifically,	 at	 the	 computational	 level.	Where	 there	 is	 no	
computational	behavior	that	the	system	should	be	performing,	there	
is	no	miscomputation.	Second,	not	all	computational	failures	count	as	
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miscomputations,	 just	 pick	 your	 favorite	 account	of	 the	normativity	
associated	with	 functional	 roles.	 Any	 of	 the	 standard	 accounts	will	
do,17	and	so	will	Piccinini’s	(2015,	ch	6).	Any	of	them	are	sufficient	for	




















the	biological	fitness	of	 S*	 (or	whatever	determines	S’s	 teleological	
function),	 it	 needs	 to	 compute	 function	 f
3










.	 Again,	 given	my	 account	 of	 computational	 structure	 and	 any	
standard	account	of	computational	norms,	S	would	be	miscomputing.18



































tem.	 The	 norms	 that	 guide	 a	 system’s	 computational	 behavior	 are	
given,	at	least	in	part,	by	something	external	to	the	system	itself,	e.g.,	













The	normatively	 loaded	 sense	of	 functional structure	 represents,	 at	 a	
certain	 level	 of	 abstraction,	 the	 dispositions	 the	 components	 should 
have	and	how	those	dispositions	should	work	together	to	underwrite	
the	dispositions	the	system	should have.	








should	be	organized	and	how	 it	 should operate.	Malfunction	 is	pos-
sible	only	when	actual	(purely	descriptive)	functioning	deviates	from	
proper	(normatively	loaded)	functioning.
The	 purely	 descriptive/normatively	 loaded	 distinction	 is	 not	 the	
narrow/wide	distinction.	The	 latter	distinction	concerns	whether,	at	
a	 certain	 level	of	 abstraction,	 a	 system’s	 environment	 can	affect	 the	
individuation	of	 its	 current	 structure	 and	behavior.	The	 former	 con-
cerns	whether,	at	a	certain	level	of	abstraction,	a	certain	structure	and	
behavior	are	(pure)	descriptions	of	or	norms	for	a	given	system.	It	is	








2.3. Two Senses of Functional Structure
To	better	understand	how	my	account	of	miscomputation	works,	we	




























components	 actually	 work	 together	 to	 explain	 the	 system’s	 disposi-
tions	 and	 behaviors.	 There	 is	 no	 further	 claim	 that	 this	 is	 how	 the	
various	 components	 should	 work	 (together).	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 and	 per-
haps	it	isn’t.	When	a	system	functions	improperly	—	when	actual	and	
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properly	 functioning	 computing	 systems,	 the	 system’s	actual compu-
tational	structure	will	be	identical	to	the	computational	structure	that	




Norm specified in wide terms:	When	the	input	voltage	is	>5v,	
output	the	voltage	that	will	allow	the	larger	system	to	op-
erate	as	an	and-gate.
Norm specified in narrow terms:	When	the	input	voltage	is	
>5v,	output	>5v.
The	first	 norm	 is	 specified	 in	wide	 terms,	 because	 it	 references	 the	
larger	system	of	which	S	is	actually	a	component.	The	second	norm	is	
specified	in	narrow	terms,	because	it	mentions	behavior	that	can	be	
individuated	 internally	 to	 the	 system.	 There	 is	 no	 reference,	 explic-
itly	 or	 implicitly,	 to	 things	 beyond	 the	 system	 itself.	 Essentially,	 the	
internally	individuated	structure	a	system	should	have	is	whatever	in-
ternally	 individuated	 structure	properly	 functioning	versions	of	 that	
system	do	 have.	 I	 say	 computational	norms	are	widely	 individuated	
not	because	they	are	specified	in	terms	that	reference	things	beyond	
the	internally	individuated	states	and	structure	of	the	system;	rather,	


























hard	 time	 identifying	 the	computational	behavior	of	malfunctioning	
systems.
Narrowly	individuated	functional	structure	is,	of	course,	not	a	good	
candidate	 to	 account	 for	normatively	 loaded	 functional	 structure	or,	





dividuation	 of	 (purely	 descriptive)	 computational	 structure	 and	 the	





on	computational	norms	that	 I	should	mention.	Recall	 that,	 in	prop-
erly	 functioning	 systems,	 a	 system’s	 purely	 descriptive	 functional	
structure	is	identical	to	its	normatively	loaded	functional	structure.	In	







Teleology	 is	 generally	 designed	 to	 play	 a	 normative	 role,	 so	 it’s	
plausible	that	the	computational	structure	that	a	system	should	have	
just	is	the	computational	structure,	if	any,	that	fulfills	the	system’s	te-
leological	 function.	Externalists	 also	 sometimes	 insist	 that	 teleology	
has	 a	 significant	 role	 to	 play	 in	 determining	 (actual)	 computational	




























3.1. Teleology and Actual Computational Structure
We	are	focused	on	the	sort	of	miscomputation	in	which	a	system	com-
putes	 a	 function	when	 it	 should	have	 computed	 a	distinct	 function.	
Piccinini	(2015b:	149,	(ii))	agrees	that	such	miscomputations	exist.	To	
adequately	 explain	 such	miscomputations,	 our	 account	 of	 computa-
tional	behavior	must	individuate	the	computational	behavior	of	mal-



















With	 that	 said,	 let’s	 see	whether	we	 can	 develop	 a	workable	 ac-
count	of	miscomputation	from	the	resources	Piccinini	provides.	What	
is	 clear	 is	 that	 teleology	 should	 play	 an	 important	 role.	 In	 chapter	
6,	Piccinini	 provides	 an	 account	of	wide	 functional	 structure	 that	 is	
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puts	 (e.g.,	 no	 input	 charge,	no	output	 charge),	 but	 it	 is	


















Yes,	 I	 remember	 that	my	 individualist	 account	 is	 subject	 to	over-















Parasitic Individuation:	 The	 system’s	 microstates	 (e.g.,	






To	see	 the	appeal	of	Parasitic	 Individuation,	 consider	an	 illustration.	






and	outputs	2v.	Parasitic	 Individuation	tells	us	 that	 the	computation	
performed	by	S	is	af(0,1)	=	0.	Due	to	malfunction,	we	get	one	value	
for	 pf(0,1)	 and	 a	 distinct	 value	 for	 af(0,1).	 Thus,	 Parasitic	 Individua-
tion	accounts	 for	 the	kind	of	miscomputation	we	are	after,	 the	kind	
in	which	a	system	implements	one	computation	when	it	should	have	
implemented	a	distinct	computation.	But	there’s	baggage.





























of	 complication	 just	 to	 get	 the	 qualitative	 overcounting	 problem	 in	
return.	Perhaps	a	 refined	version	of	Parasitic	 Individuation	will	 fare	
better.
3.2. Parasitic Individuation Plus
Miscomputation	 is	 a	 special	 kind	 of	 computing	 malfunction.	 No	





eligible	 to	compute	F,	 is	not	actually	computing	F.	A	 theory	has	 the	
latter	problem	when	 it	 allows	a	 system	 to	 compute	F	when	 the	 sys-
tem	is	not	even	eligible	to	compute	F,	i.e.,	the	intrinsic	structure	of	the	
system	is	incompatible	with	computing	F.	The	latter	sort	of	problem	
seems	 to	be	worse.	 It	 is	 tantamount	 to	a	 category	mistake.	My	 indi-























questions,	one	normative	—	Why do the norms of K apply to D2? —	and	









	 is	 functioning	properly,	and	 its	medium-in-
dependent	functional	structure	treats	voltages	in	the	way	that	proper	













function	—	recall	 that	 the	 parasitic	 approach	 makes	 the	 individua-












































plus	 this	 constraint:	 a	malfunctioning	 system	computes	 (and	 so	has	





qualitative	 overcounting	 problems.	 Parasitic	 Individuation	 individu-



























norms	demand	 that	pf(1,1)	 =	0,	≤3v	 count	 as	 one	digit	 (0),	 and	>5v	
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individuated	 teleological	 function	 is	 required	 for	 something	 to	 com-
pute,	and	it	helps	determine	which	function	is	computed.	
There	 is	 an	 intermediate	 position	 between	 strict	 individualism	
and	typical	externalism	that	we	can	call	quasi-individualism.	Quasi-


















wants	 to	allow	that	 the	system	computes	over,	 say,	voltage	ranges	without	
computing	over	temperature	ranges	too,	then	she	can	tweak	the	first	pass:	a	
system	computes	over a given kind of input	only	if	the	system	has	a	teleological	
function	to	compute	over that kind of input.	
miscomputing	precisely	because	it	mistypes	microstates,	i.e.,	it	groups	
microstates	into	macrostates	in	ways	that	it	shouldn’t.25
4. Quasi-Individualism: The Best of Both Approaches?
My	individualist	account	of	computational	behavior	made	explaining	







Piccinini-inspired	 parasitic	 approaches	 decisively	 avoid	 limited	















may	seem	 to	violate	Medium-Independent	 Individuation,	but	 I	don’t	 think	
it	does.	It	is	certainly	true	that	the	system	treats	(i)	and	(ii)	differently	than	
(iii),	and	the	system	is	arguably	treating	(i)	and	(ii)	in	the	same	way	at	some	
appropriate	 level	of	generality	—	the	 level	of	generality	at	which	 the	 larger	










we	 considered	had	problematic	 implications	 for	what	 systems	were	
computing	when	they	were	malfunctioning	(§3).	
Fourth,	 for	 those	 who	 are	 bothered	 by	 individualism’s	 flirtation	
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structure	 (that	 satisfies	 the	definitive	 list)	—	and	 this	applies	 to	both	
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putes	when	its	behavior	manifests	a	narrow	computational	structure	







what	 it	 takes	 to	 adequately	 account	 for	 it	 (§2.1).	 A	 system	miscom-
putes	when	 it	 computes	 in	 a	way	 that	 it	 should	not	 compute.	Thus,	










because	 the	 former	 is	 individuated	narrowly	 and	 the	 latter	 are	 indi-
viduated	widely	(§2.2).	
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